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The Language of Dementia Science and the Science of Dementia Language: Linguistic 
Interpretations of an Interdisciplinary Research Field 
 
Abstract 
Language is a balance of precision and flexibility, and scientific dialogue across disciplines 
faces challenges in how terms are used and how phenomena, including language itself, are 
described and explained.  Taking dementia as its focus, this paper offers linguistic 
perspectives on causes of inherent difficulty with terminological exactness. Attention is paid 
to the interface between the positivist imperatives of clinical evaluation and the relativist 
interpretations that help make sense of uses of terms across contexts. Two types of reason are 
examined for why the language produced by people with dementia is sometimes hard to 
characterize and predict: the theoretical challenges inherent in analyzing the language of 
dementia, and the social variables that affect how that language is manifested. The paper 
concludes with the vision of linguistic research using corpus-based discourse analysis to 
underpin and catalyze communication-bridging activities in interdisciplinary projects, within 
and beyond the dementia context. 
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This paper explores how linguistics can support research across interdisciplinary boundaries 
in the dementia context. Linguistic research gets ‘beneath the skin’ of language, uncovering 
tacit assumptions and interrogating the relationship between how something is said and what 
a hearer or reader infers. Both individual words and combinations of them encode layers of 
meaning, well beyond what dictionary definitions can capture. Scientists are acculturated into 
discipline-specific uses of words and phrases, as shortcuts for complex ideas understood and 
accepted within that community of practice but not necessarily beyond it. When scientists 
collaborate across disciplines, miscommunication is a significant risk. Linguistic science is 
equipped to assist interdisciplinary researchers with understanding why apparently simple 
conversations about shared information and objectives do not always go smoothly. 
Dementia attracts research from the medical, biological, environmental and social 
sciences, as well as the humanities. Its joint aim is to further knowledge about causes, 
characteristics and potential future cures for dementia, and ways of accurately diagnosing it 
and treating and caring for people who develop it. But different conceptualizations of the 
knowledge underpinning these activities generate an uneven surface on which to kick the 
elliptical terminological ball. Dementia, Alzheimer’s disease and Mild Cognitive Impairment 
are shown below to have less than clear-cut meanings, once considered in their contexts of 
use. Ways are needed for navigating these ambiguities. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that in dementia, language itself is a 
variable. Patterns in the language produced by people with dementia (PwDs) contribute to 
understanding the underlying phenomenon. Two aspects of the interface between the 
language about dementia and the language observed in the dementia context will be 
considered: (1) the role played by linguistic evidence in diagnosing and predicting the risk of 
dementia; (2) how society’s ways of talking about dementia shape the contexts in which 
PwDs generate language. Linguistic theory provides mechanisms for tracking the relationship 
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between what someone says or writes and its cognitive and social motivation on the one 
hand, and impact on the other. Thus, it is shown how the language of dementia cannot be 
fully separated from the language used to talk about dementia. The final discussion confronts 
the implications of these complexities and offers an innovative way for linguists to contribute 
to improving interdisciplinary communication. 
 
Terminological Ambiguity 
Knowledge about dementia encompasses genetics and biomarkers, neurological evidence of 
the triggers and trajectories of physiological changes, clinical approaches to diagnosis and 
treatment, healthcare protocols, and studies of the behavior of people with dementia and 
those they interact with. In all of these domains language is the main medium for sharing 
knowledge. Compared with other knowledge-sharing mediums such as mathematical 
expressions, diagrams and images, language is the most flexible but, by the same token, 
potentially the least exact. It is also the most localized. Whereas there is universal agreement 
about the meaning of 4 and <, interpretations of words, even between speakers of one 
language, can vary on a geographical, temporal and disciplinary basis. 
Terminology is a particular type of vocabulary, intended to behave more like a 
mathematical symbol and thus support effective understanding. Formal definitions and 
careful delineation should establish and sustain clarity so that, ideally, there is a shared 
understanding of what a term means by virtue of a single point of reference and consistent 
use. Terminology should enable readers either directly to understand a text, or to recognize 
the limitations of their understanding. 
In practice, however, terminology can also be an insidious barrier to understanding. 
There are two main reasons. One is that in a scientific account not every term is defined, 
because assumptions are made about the existing knowledge of the reader. The other is that 
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language has a life of its own, and a term, however clearly defined, picks up connotations 
from its uses, that gradually separate its fine-grained meaning into potentially incompatible 
sub-meanings. 
 
Why Terminology is Not Always Defined 
The decision on the part of an author not to define a term is a largely pragmatic one. 
Definitions are cumbersome and can be distracting if the text has a different purpose. For 
example, we will see later how linguists debate what the word is. Yet, other than in 
discussions about that issue, linguists will not expect to define word before they use the term. 
It will be left implicit that everyone knows enough about what a word is, at a general level, 
for the author’s meaning to be clear. Vagueness is sometimes sufficient and even preferable 
(Wray, 2015). 
Yet if a term is used without a definition, it creates the risk of misunderstanding. When 
one is familiar with a particular definition of a term, one may not be alert to the possibility 
that the author meant something else.1 Thus, perversely, it can be quite helpful when 
terminology tips into jargon—terms that one does not understand—because one does at least 
know that a definition should be sought. 
 
Fluidity in Terminology 
The second potential barrier to understanding is that terminology is not static. A basic 
definition of the meanings of dementia and Alzheimer’s disease is found in the medical 
section of the online Freedictionary:2 
 
Dementia is a group of symptoms caused by gradual death of brain cells. The loss 
of cognitive abilities that occurs with dementia leads to impairments in memory, 
LANGUAGE AND DEMENTIA SCIENCE 6 
 
 
 
reasoning, planning, and behavior. While the overwhelming number of PwDs are 
elderly, dementia is not an inevitable part of aging; instead, dementia is caused by 
specific brain diseases. Alzheimer's disease (AD) is the most common cause, 
followed by vascular or multi-infarct dementia. 
 
Yet specialist definitions are more complicated. The most authoritative source relating to 
dementia is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 2013). This 5th 
edition (DSM-5) introduces new terminology that downgrades dementia as an independent 
term (though retaining it as a qualifier in sub-types, such as vascular dementia) in favor of 
the broader major neurocognitive disorder (p. 816). The rationale for the change is the 
increased capacity to diagnose the specific locus of the brain disease causing the cognitive 
changes (p. xlii). DSM-5 manages the transition by juxtaposing the old and new terms in a 
quite cumbersome and not always unequivocal way—dementia is frequently mentioned in 
brackets when the new term is used, even though they are not synonymous. DSM-5 also 
makes concessions to established practice, e.g.,, “The term dementia is retained in DSM-5 for 
continuity and may be used in settings where physicians and patients are accustomed to this 
term” (p. 591). 
DSM-5’s handling of the “major neurocognitive disorder due to Alzheimer's disease” 
(e.g.,, p.23) implies that it is a well-defined, unitary, diagnosable condition. However, this 
position contrasts with the assertion made in a 2012 radio interview by Sir John Bell, 
President of the UK Academy of Medical Sciences. Commenting on the reasons why drug 
treatments for AD are not yet all that effective, he said: “It’s not clear that Alzheimer’s 
disease is a single disease. If you try to develop a drug to a disease that is just a name and is 
an assortment of different disorders, then the likelihood of failing is quite high” (BBC, 2012). 
If it is vital that pharmacology deconstruct the concept of Alzheimer’s disease, then a more 
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fine-grained diagnosis of sub-types is presumably desirable. The cases of dementia in DSM-5 
and Bell’s claim about AD show how terminological uses risk impeding alertness to 
important new information. 
A further type of definition of AD is associated with directly observed neurophysiological 
characteristics, such as reduced hippocampal and cortical volume, beta-amyloid plaques and 
tangles of tau (e.g.,, Förstl, 2010; APA, 2013). The brain disease and the symptoms of AD do 
not always coincide, for the symptoms of other diseases can mimic those of AD, and some 
people with plaques and tangles have no symptoms (Beach et al., 2012; Iacono et al., 2009; 
Kempler and Goral, 2008). It is the job of research to understand why the mapping of a 
phenomenon across domains is not exact. To do that, scientists must understand the potential 
of definitions to entail different information in different contexts. 
The term Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), which DSM-5 (APA 2013) described as 
“substantially congruent with mild NCD [Neurocognitive Disorder]” (p. 608), has been on a 
particularly interesting trajectory. MCI is a recognized precursor of AD, but, as DSM-5 notes, 
only a “substantial fraction” of those with MCI go on to develop AD (APA, 2013, p. 612). A 
decade and a half ago, Milwain (2000) pointed out how the term was accumulating 
associations through its use as a euphemistic entry point for discussions about AD with 
patients and their families. This meant that the subset of people with mild memory loss as a 
natural function of ageing were being equated with those whose mild memory loss was a 
precursor of AD. In short, the term MCI has been in shift towards meaning “early AD”. 
Interventions suitable for those who do have early AD might not be desirable for those who 
do not (Petersen et al., 1999; Selnes et al., 2012), and serious social, psychological and 
economic risks could ensue. Paralleling Bell’s observation, above, initiatives to pinpoint the 
observable differences between these two types of MCI might be undermined by the use of 
the single term. 
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Meanwhile, terms also cross the divide into general usage, adopting loose, even 
inaccurate, connotations, partly because accuracy is a less powerful driver than attitudes and 
emotions. For example, the husband of “Joan”, a singing teacher with symptoms consistent 
with Alzheimer’s, confirmed her dementia diagnosis, but insisted it was not Alzheimer’s 
“because if it was, she’d be talking to you one minute, then she’d turn to talk to someone 
else, and then turn back to you and not remember she’d been talking to you before” (Wray, 
2010, p. 519). His lay definition of Alzheimer’s was seemingly shaped by more than just 
limited knowledge. He did not want Joan to have something called “Alzheimer’s” because of 
its profound social and personal implications. So he characterized it in a manner that 
excluded her from its domain (see also Schrauf & Iris, 2014). 
Terms like dementia and Alzheimer’s disease may also be used inaccurately by care 
professionals—not because they lack access to formal definitions and to individuals’ 
diagnoses, but because of the embodied reality of these conditions in their work. A resident 
might be labelled as having dementia as a shorthand for “challenging behavior” such as 
aggression, even though “aggressive behavior is not unique to people with dementia” 
(Alzheimer’s Society, 2013). 
 
Insights into Terminology from Linguistics 
How can confronting issues with terminology help our understanding of dementia and 
associated phenomena across disciplines? Linguistics offers a means of coping with the 
complexity, rather than just seeing it. Driving the science of dementia are strong positivist 
traditions that offer hope of finally having a clear, delineated understanding of the 
phenomenon. Implicit is that language behavior is also clear-cut. Linguists, however, 
generally conceptualize language in relativist terms. Language shapes how we think, while 
our beliefs, assumptions and usages determine what words mean for us and others. A 
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relativist position tolerates ambiguities in language use and exploits the breadth of language 
meaning, as constituted through the context and cotext (the other words used around a term), 
to examine phenomena in new ways. 
Linguistics shows us how denotation (e.g.,, Alzheimer’s is a disease that affects memory) 
is supplemented by layers of connotation (e.g.,, people with Alzheimer’s are typically old, 
may need assistance in their daily lives). Fine-grained information about a word’s meaning is 
inferred from other words typically associated with it. These collocates color a term’s 
interpretation in a manner that is typically culturally-determined rather than absolute. For 
instance, dementia co-occurs with words and phrases like ravaged by, start a war on, 
beating, fear, dreaded, vigilant, lapses, bad news,3 indicating that the dominant narrative is 
one of conflict (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). Once in the mindset of conflict, one’s perception 
of what dementia is like, and how it can be responded to, will tend to be contained within that 
frame. 
Recognizing the power of metaphorical associations can be productive for challenging 
and extending understanding. In a study by Vittoria (1999), changing how AD was talked 
about reframed speakers’ negative stereotypes, to present people with AD as “socially 
responsive actor[s] with a surviving self that is to be treated with respect” (p. 361). 
Meanwhile, the terminology used in other languages can raise our awareness of how some 
characteristics of a complex phenomenon are cast into shade by a cultural focus on others, 
when all require recognition (Berrios, 2010, pp. 5-6). For example, dimāg, “hot brain”, used 
in part of India to describe PwDs, emphasizes “anger rather than memory as a fundamental 
index of senile difference” (Cohen, 1995: 314). 
 
The Analysis of Language as a Marker of Dementia 
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We turn now to the language that PwDs use. First we consider how the language of PwDs is 
talked about, both as object and medium. Then we explore the parameters for making sense 
of language patterns, and how they interface with linguistic theory. 
 
Talking About the Language of Dementia 
Language is a variable that pervades our understandings of and engagement with dementia 
well beyond the issues with labelling already discussed. It is a complex phenomenon, the 
different facets of which can seem quasi-autonomous, though in fact they are not. It is a basic 
human cognitive capacity in its own right, but also makes visible other capacities and 
functions. It conveys information about what we see, hear, feel, want, and remember. It helps 
us organize our thoughts and plans, and is the medium for learning and for passing 
information to others. Choices in how we use language signal our beliefs, attitudes and 
allegiances, marking our social identity. As a result, what PwDs say, and how, offers a 
window on their capabilities, perceptions and experiences. 
Meanwhile, how we talk about language is a window on what we understand it to be, how 
we understand it to work, and what we believe to be possible for it to do. These factors 
influence what we look for and expect, what we measure, and how we reconcile the pieces of 
the language jigsaw as a whole—from formal test behavior to informal conversation.  
- Figure 1 around here - 
Figure 1 maps out part of the field of play for interdisciplinary understandings of 
language in the dementia context (a further part is presented as Figure 2 later). Central are the 
two main sources of information about the language of a PwD: day-to-day communication 
and tests. Judgements about a person’s underlying linguistic capacity based on how they 
manage everyday interaction are vulnerable to a range of variables that are difficult to 
recognize, let alone control. Consequently, tests are the preferred route to a clearer and 
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replicable snapshot of ability, even though they do not cover the full gamut of uses of 
language. Such tests can reveal striking patterns, some offering direct insights into problems 
that might be encountered in everyday talk, such as having more difficulty naming animals, 
fruit, vegetables than tools, clothing, furniture (Whatmough et al., 2003). 
As Figure 1 shows, test design is iteratively informed both by previous performance and 
by theoretical models, so as to hone the accurate mapping of performance onto an 
understanding of the individual’s underlying capacities. Diagnosis also aims to take account 
of the individual’s performance outside a formal test situation. However, truly informal 
interaction is sometimes difficult to achieve in an assessment setting and, consequently, 
decisions about a person’s future, from diagnosis onwards, should depend on more than test 
results (Asp and De Villiers, 2010). A person’s capacity to compensate for problems plays a 
major role in how well they, and others, can cope with the interaction (see later discussion).  
 
Conceptualizing Language Units 
Figure 1 indicates how our inferences about an individual’s linguistic capacity are drawn 
from what we observe, and how what we observe is shaped by what we believe it is possible 
to see. It behooves us to recognize how easily our understandings can be colored by implicit 
assumptions about the nature of language as a system. The point can be illustrated through a 
consideration of the “word” as the dominant unit for measuring language performance. 
Balota and Yap (2006, p. 649) express the status quo for most researchers of language 
both within and beyond linguistics: “Research at the word level is particularly tractable and 
revealing, as words are well-defined units that can be analyzed and processed at various 
levels.” Clinical and psychological testing, along with quantitative studies using linguistic 
corpora (large, representative collections of texts), converge on the assumption that the word 
is a reliable unit of measurement. The word is easy to find and is a strongly intuitive concept. 
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Yet the different fundamental properties of “wordness”—as a unit of meaning, pronunciation 
and grammar—fail fully to coincide with either each other or the written form (letters with a 
space either side) (Trask, 2004; Lucy, 2010; Wray, 2015): 
 
lexical items4 may be bigger or smaller than grammatical words5; not all grammatical 
words are lexical items; more controversially, there are rather complex lexical items 
that contain no phonological material (Jackendoff 2000, p. 30). 
 
There are two important reasons why this issue should resonate beyond the boundaries of 
linguistics. Both relate to the risk of perceiving precision in scientific measurement where in 
fact there is not precision. Firstly, any measure of dementia behavior that relies on counting 
words will not be replicable unless there is agreement about their enumeration. Chand et al. 
(2012), seeking a definitive word count to calculate idea density, report four different values 
for the same text, according to which software program was used. Idea density, the number of 
ideas per ten words, has been found to vary according to both the stage of Alzheimer’s (e.g., 
Le et al., 2011) and future risk of it (e.g., Engelmann et al., 2010; Iacono et al., 2009; 
Snowdon et al., 1996). Different methods for counting words (and also ideas) could certainly 
impact on whether impaired and unimpaired language are accurately contrasted (Chand et al., 
2012). 
Secondly, although the archetypical unit of meaning (the lexical item) maps onto a single 
written word, usually a noun, it is far from the case that all the lexical items we use to 
construct linguistic output are single words (e.g., the President of the United States). The 
entire form is stored in memory as the representation of that idea, and it can be retrieved as a 
single unit. Such expressions, formulaic language, have been the focus of considerable 
research in recent years, with evidence of their importance emerging from computational 
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linguistics (e.g.,, Biber et al., 2004; Sinclair, 1991), psychology and second language learning 
(e.g.,, Segalowitz, 2010), phonology (e.g.,, Lin 2010); neurolinguistics (e.g.,, Tremblay & 
Baayen, 2010) and linguistic theory (e.g.,, Wray, 2002; 2008; Wray & Grace, 2007). 
Because formulaic expressions make cognitively low demands, using them offers a 
significant social payoff to a person who might not otherwise be able to engage in 
conversation (Wray, 2011, 2016). “Maureen” (Davis et al., 2013) delivers a small repertoire 
of story fragments about her childhood with an engaging impression of freshness that could 
fool a stranger into believing she had no impairment. Expressions behaving like single words 
probably do not require any grammatical processing to put together or understand, even 
though they do contain grammar. Consequently, they may muddy the waters regarding the 
grammatical capacity of a PwD. In examining dementia language, some accommodation, in 
terms of grammatical theory, is therefore needed for the likelihood that the output is simpler 
to produce than it looks (e.g., Bates et al., 1995; Trousdale & Hoffman, 2012).  
 
How Dementia Language is Shaped and Interpreted by Society  
- Figure 2 around here - 
Figure 2 shows how professional and lay perceptions of the nature of dementia 
communication help generate societal representations of what a PwD can say and do. 
According to Ballenger (2006), during the 20th Century there was a shift in the default 
interpretation of the term senile, from “old” to “mentally infirm”, part of a social trend 
towards pathologizing previously unstigmatized aspects of ageing. Such changes often mark 
more general social preoccupations. Post (2000) and Ballenger (2006) argue that dementia is 
socially demonized in Western society because it “violates the spirit...of self-control, 
independence, economic productivity, and cognitive enhancement that defines our [current, 
western] dominant image of human fulfilment” (Post, 2000, p. 245). Smith (1996) challenges 
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the assumption that there is “a universal neuropathology [for AD]” (p. 267) and argues for 
greater awareness of cross-cultural differences in how conditions like dementia are perceived. 
These powerful social positions color how information is interpreted for mass 
consumption by the print and broadcast media, and what individuals and organizations take 
as their starting point when judging what is appropriate and desirable (e.g.,, what sorts of 
changes to communicative practice will constitute being “dementia friendly”). Consequently, 
the way society presents dementia communication has significant capacity to affect the 
communicative contexts to which PwDs have access (Wray, 2011). In turn, that impacts on 
the observations that researchers across disciplines can make (Figure 2). 
When social expectations of the capabilities of PwDs are low, little is asked of them, 
but when they are given more responsibility, more capability is stimulated (Sabat, 2001).6 
“Joan” (Wray, 2010) is a case in point. This experienced singing teacher could share her 
knowledge and advise on singers’ performances during a workshop weekend because she 
was in a social situation where such behavior was expected of her. The context gave her 
license to produce authoritative and incisive information forged from a strong sense of self-
identity (c.f. Small et al., 1998), even though she had only limited linguistic capabilities. All 
too often, however, the prevailing assumption is that PwDs can’t understand anything, and 
don’t have anything interesting to say (Lloyd et al., 2006; Polk, 2005). The opportunities for 
interaction may become so restricted as to fulfil the prophecy.7 
Figure 2 also highlights how the patterns observed in the linguistic output of PwDs 
shape professional and lay perceptions of what dementia communication is like. We already 
saw in Figure 1 that these patterns are interpreted through the receiver’s models of how 
processing, grammar and function work. The calibrations of those models help determine the 
prevailing social representations of dementia communication. For example, filler words and 
expressions like “thing”, “you know” and “and things like that” tend to be viewed as 
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indicative of vagueness or sloppiness. Heard to excess in PwDs, it is easy to assume that they 
are a marker of deficit. However, that might not always be so. 
Formulaic expressions like this may also be a tool for patching up fluency under 
cognitive pressure, so that the turn can be completed (Wray, 2010, 2016), and so control can 
be maintained of the content and direction of a conversation (Davis et al., 2013). They can 
thus represent a valid and effective adjustment to the changes in communicative capacity 
caused by dementia, drawing on compensatory strategies developed through a lifetime of 
managing occasional lapses in concentration, embarrassing linguistic incidents and 
breakdowns in communication. PwDs bring with them a sophisticated lifelong portfolio of 
communicative skills, interactional agendas and personal priorities. But these attributes can 
be difficult to recognize, if one is looking for something else. 
Interdisciplinary researchers need to be aware of the multiple influences on language 
behavior. If a PwD does not come up with an anticipated word, word-finding difficulties may 
be only part of the story. One must also ask how (un)important it might be, in the current 
context, to strive to find the word, and also what other tactics are employed to resolve their 
communicative problem. Joan used mime and quotations from songs to fill gaps in her word-
finding, as well as deferring to the piano accompanist, who articulated ideas for her to 
reclaim (Wray, 2010). MB, a PwD described by Davis and Maclagan (2010) used “you tell 
her” to pass responsibility for answering a question to her daughter. Since medical history 
was being sought, it was pragmatic of MB to hand the job over to someone likely to 
remember and express herself better. 
In sum, Figure 2 shows how the terms used to talk about dementia can all too easily 
shape the world in which PwDs live, while the world they live in shapes the opportunities 
they have for expressing themselves. We need to be alert to the fact that dementia behaviors 
do not occur in a vacuum.  More than that, researchers and clinicians must be vigilant about 
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how their use of language might influence what they seek to observe. Interdisciplinary 
dialogue about the impact of the social aspects of language behavior is vital. 
 
New Approaches to Interdisciplinary Understandings of Language in the Dementia 
Context 
Managing an Inherently Complex Phenomenon 
Language, as an object of study, a conduit of expression and the medium for sharing research 
and clinical knowledge, is unavoidably complex. We have seen that terminology is difficult 
to keep under control, and an important take-home message from linguistics is that meaning 
drift is not an aberration but a reflection of what language needs to be like. It is how we 
sustain flexibility in both thought and expression. Language, as an integrated system of 
cognitive, social and structural variables, offers no simple solutions to the problem of 
terminological drift. However, there are opportunities within linguistics to help navigate the 
challenges. 
 
Being Pragmatic About Interdisciplinarity—the Role of “Interpretivist” 
The generally relativist stance taken in linguistics accommodates the need to resist looking 
for simple answers in complex systems (e.g.,, De Bot, Lowie & Verspoor, 2007; Larsen-
Freeman & Cameron, 2008; Lowie, 2013). On the other hand, it is difficult to make progress 
at the practical level, if one can only acknowledge that things are complicated. Rather, 
linguists need to deploy their insights and skills to make a difference to how science is 
practiced.  
 Linguists are well-placed to help scientists navigate the linguistic map imposed by their 
respective disciplines and develop awareness that the maps of others are not the same (Wray 
& Wallace, 2014, 2015). For interdisciplinary scientific communication to be effective, all 
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parties need to recognize that their thinking is shaped by tacit connotations, beliefs and 
assumptions disguised by an apparently common language. The membrane between 
disciplines is not porous, and osmosis will not naturally result from juxtaposing research 
activities. A stable middle ground of shared knowledge must be deliberately created.  
 The linguist, then, can act as an interpreter of the language of science. The role is in some 
ways similar to that of a knowledge broker for the translation of research findings into 
practice (e.g., Glegg & Hoens, 2016; Strekalova et al., this issue), because it entails an 
intervention with specialist skills to release untapped potential. However, the linguist as 
interdisciplinary ‘interpretivist’8 (cf. Wray & Wallace, 2015) is different in one important 
respect: the intervention must be introspective first, before the science can hope to reach out 
effectively to lay audiences. The aim is to facilitate effective communication within the 
research group, as a means of ensuring that any external benefits are founded on a robust and 
holistic scientific understanding of the phenomena. 
Carefully examining how phenomena are discussed, the interpretivist will take 
responsibility for establishing where the collaborating disciplines most risk being confounded 
by under-exposed differences in apparently common terminological language, or overlooking 
compatible findings because of different ways of talking about them. One particularly  
flexible method for doing so is corpus-informed discourse analysis. Quantitative 
computational methods first analyze collections of texts for discipline-specific uses of terms, 
before interview and observational methods contribute qualitative insights into the subtle 
decisions that term-users make (e.g.,, Baker, 2006; Baker et al., 2008; Handford, 2014; 
Partington et al., 2004; Potts & Semino, 2017; Zhu et al., 2016). The computational analyses 
can highlight spikes and troughs not visible to the naked eye. That information is used to 
direct precise questions that tease out fine-grained meaning.  
LANGUAGE AND DEMENTIA SCIENCE 18 
 
 
 
 Given the centrality of language to the pursuance of science, it is perhaps surprising that 
interdisciplinary research does not already typically feature regular sessions in which 
contributors consider just what they mean when they use a given term, and what assumptions 
they bring to discussions about a given phenomenon. Were the interpretivist role to be 
recognized as beneficial, then future interdisciplinary research projects might include in the 
team a linguist whose first job was to carry out a risk assessment of the potential for 
miscommunication during the project. Subsequently, observational and interview sessions 
with the disciplinary specialists, along with discourse analyses of team meetings, could 
surface linguistic sources of miscommunication and rectify them. 
 
Conclusion 
In keeping with the special issue theme, this paper has explored how language, a primary 
resource for scientific communication, can impede as well as facilitate understanding. though 
Although the solutions offered are much more broadly applicable, dementia is a particularly 
challenging case. Firstly, its research, diagnosis and care require the involvement of experts 
of many types, each bringing linguistic usages with their own manifold connotations. 
Secondly, language variation is a manifestation of dementia itself, which demands adequate 
language for talking about language. Finally, the science of dementia is fundamentally 
grounded in the actions and experiences of the general public, who also need, and have, a 
language for talking about the phenomenon. Linguistics engages with how, at all these levels, 
the patterns in what we say are sensitive not only to cognitive but also social variables, which 
affect the scientists as well as people with dementia. 
The linguist as an “interpretivist” can use sophisticated research methods to identify and 
help mitigate the risks of miscommunication, both between the investigators and between 
scientists and the general public. The essentially relativist stance of the linguist will 
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encourage acceptance of the inherent complexity of language, challenging uncritical 
positivism. This is a vital component of a holistic approach to care, where the relationship 
between general, scientifically verified patterns and the particular experience of the 
individual can be bewildering. Creative responses to both scientific and daily life challenges 
come from recognising that everyone brings their own portfolio of experience, knowledge 
and skills to a situation, including the PwD.  
Meanwhile, unbridled pluralism is kept in check by the necessary pragmatism of 
prioritising workable practices for effective dementia diagnosis, treatment and care. 
Consideration of the daily experiences of people with dementia, their family, and caregivers 
must remain central to how the science progresses. And the scientists must ensure they are 
adequately equipped to communicate effectively with their stakeholders and with each other. 
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Notes 
 
1. Wray & Wallace (2014, 2015) interviewed top international researchers about their 
interdisciplinary collaborations. One said, “I’ve discovered that we use [some words] in the 
social sciences in an entirely different way to computer science and so you just have to get 
down to real basics and pin down what your assumptions are” (2014, p. 43). Several 
informants mentioned the need to have sufficient “interactional expertise” (Collins, 2007) to 
know where issues of misunderstandings might arise. 
2. http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/dementia 
3. Examples drawn from the first 20 entries listed for Alzheimer’s in the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English, using the Brigham Young tool, corpus.byu.edu. 
4. Word-like units of meaning. 
5. Units with a grammatical role. 
6. See Ryan et al (1986:, p.16) for a similar model of the social determinants of language 
production in dementia. 
7. “[A caregiver] was holding the pegs up to her face and saying, ‘Did you ever have pegs 
Mary? Did you have pegs like these? Do you like pegs? Look at the pegs’.” David Clegg 
(personal communication, August 2011). 
8. The term interpretivist is used here in order to keep it distinct from translational science, 
the bridging of pure and applied science to find real world applications for research 
discoveries. 
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Figure 1: Relationship between linguistic capability, performance and interpretation   
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Figure 2:  The impact of social perceptions on dementia language 
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